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Abstract—The problems that social media users have in ap-
propriately controlling access to their content has been well
documented in previous research. A promising method of pro-
viding assistance to users is by learning from the access control
decisions made by them and making future recommendations.
In this paper, we present REACT, a learning mechanism which
utilizes information available in the social network in conjunc-
tion with information about the content to be shared to provide
users with access control recommendations. We demonstrate
the highly accurate performance of REACT through a detailed
empirical evaluation and also discuss ways of personalizing
it for different users in order to improve performance even
further.
1. Introduction
Social media users interact with vast network of people
representing various facets of their life such as work, family,
education, etc. In such a scenario, it is essential for them
to make informed access control decisions to preserve the
“contextual integrity” of their information. Any user who
discloses information on social media has a notion of the
“intended recipients” and the context in which they would
view that information and hence preservation of “contextual
integrity” is essential in order to avoid a privacy breach [1].
Unfortunately, social media users have been found to be
less than capable of accurately reasoning about the ac-
tual recipients of their content and even when they do,
they struggle to appropriately control who can access their
content on such platforms [2]. The inability of users to
make appropriate access control decisions often results in
“unintended disclosure” of information [3]. When users are
aware of their audience, and are provided with finer grained
access controls, they tend to be much more selective in
granting access to their information [4]. Mainstream social
media sites such as Facebook and Google+ have made an
effort to assist users in managing their friend networks by
providing them with “Lists” and “Circles” [4] respectively.
However, recent research findings suggest that hardly any
users employ these features when making access control
decisions, arguably due to the effort this requires from
them [5]. There have also been some efforts to improve
visualization to enhance comprehension of access control
policies among users [6] but even with these approaches, the
burden of appropriately configuring access controls remains
on the user. This burden can possibly be alleviated by
providing accurate access control recommendation to users
when they disclose information to their social network.
Providing recommendations to the user in a dynamic
medium like social media is a sizeable challenge, and it is
essential to consider and recognize the overall “context” of
a disclosure to provide a “context-aware” recommendation
which would safeguard the user’s privacy [1]. In particular,
the “social context” of any information disclosure in social
media forms an essential part of the overall context and
influences the access control decisions made by the user [7].
There are a lot of types of social network information which
can be leveraged in order to appropriately define the social
context and assist the user in configuring an appropriate
access control policy. Different types of social relationships,
commonly represented in terms of communities [8], [9], and
the social relationship strength, commonly represented in
terms of profile attribute similarity (or “closeness” exhibited
by profile attributes) [10], [11], are considered important
in influencing a user’s access control policy. In addition to
the “who”, determined by social relationships, the “what”,
i.e. the content itself, also needs to be considered to make
informed access control decisions [12]. As discussed later
on in more detail and to the best of our knowledge, none
of the previously proposed access control recommendation
mechanisms consider both the “who” (relationship type and
strength) and the “what”.
In this paper, we bridge this gap and present REACT,
which is an access control recommendation mechanism that
considers the social context of information disclosure rep-
resented by the type and strength of social relationships in
conjunction with information about the content in the form
of annotations or “tags”. Our results show that REACT pro-
vides highly accurate access control recommendations using
these types of information. As privacy and access control
behavior is very personal to individual users [13], we explore
methods of personalizing REACT to go beyond a “one-
size-fits-all” approach to improve performance even further.
When the most favorable configuration is implemented for
each user, REACT produces an accuracy of 93.2% across
our entire dataset.
2. Design
Figure 1 depicts REACT and the components it uses to
make access control recommendations to the users. REACT
is designed based on previous evidence which focuses on
access control behaviors of social media users. For any such
Figure 1: Figure showing the various components of REACT
recommendation mechanism to be usable, it is important
to consider the social context of the information disclosure
such that the “contextual integrity” of the information is
preserved [7]. The social context can be derived from the
interpersonal relationships, defined in terms of their “type”
(friend, family, etc.) represented by partitions (or commu-
nities) [8], and the “strength” or closeness, represented by
similarity of profile attributes [10], [11], all of which can
be automatically retrieved and analyzed from the social
network of the user. Additionally, the information about the
content itself forms an integral part of the overall context
of the disclosure. We describe the particular attributes of
REACT which represent these types of information to rep-
resent the social context of disclosure in order to provide
meaningful access control recommendations to the user.
2.1. Attributes Used
Relationship Type is represented by community mem-
bership in REACT. We considered network based commu-
nity detection algorithms which require only the network
connections of a user’s friends in order to generate commu-
nities, which may or may not be overlapping as discussed
later on. In our previous work, we empirically evaluated 8
well-known community finding algorithms and found that
Clique Percolation Method (CPM) provides the best fit
with respect to particular access control decisions made by
social media users [14]. Even though CPM has a compara-
tively higher computational complexity as compared to other
similar community detection algorithms, its impact on the
timeliness of access control decisions would be minimal as
it only needs to be executed to update communities when a
new friend is added or removed from a user’s network, but
not every time a user would make an access control decision
which happens much more often.
Relationship Strength can be calculated by fetching
and analyzing the similarity of profile attributes and infor-
mation in social networks [15], [16]. This has been also
exploited as a basis to recommend access control decisions
due to the known interplay between relationship strength
and access control decisions [10]. However, there are four
main problems associated with this approach: 1) many users
leave profile attributes blank or set privacy controls so they
cannot be retrieved; 2) there is a huge amount of potential
attributes to be used and the associated time to fetch and
analyze them; 3) some of the attributes could be seen as
too privacy intrusive (e.g. entire conversations exchanged
between users) to be used precisely to improve privacy and
access control; 4) some of the attributes are dependent on
the specific social media platform. Our previous research
found that using only the size of network (Total Friends)
and shared contacts (Mutual Friends) between individuals is
sufficient in producing the same accuracy for access control
recommendation as when using all attributes available while
addressing the discussed problems [17]. In addition to these
two attributes, REACT also uses the difference in network
sizes of the user and each of their friends (Friend Difference)
to represent relationship strength.
In addition to considering relationship defining attributes
from the social network of a user, REACT also consid-
ers information about the Content being shared. This is
essential in order to further define the context of any in-
formation disclosure, and previous research indeed showed
that annotations of content by users employing “tags” can
be used to create access control policies and that they are
minimally disruptive for the user [18]. These tags can be
about the topic of the content (e.g., Flickr has a list of
potential topic categories for the photos users upload) or
further information about the social context (e.g., friends
being tagged in photos or mentions being made to them in
text posts). The design of REACT is agnostic to the type of
content being shared, and it considers all tags or information
about the content available, whether manually provided by
users or automatically inferred by tools such as [12].
2.2. Blacklisted Friends
Social media users often have vast friend networks con-
sisting of many friends — as we will see later on users
in our study had an average of 265 friends (s.d = 121).
However, it has been empirically found that social media
users often intend to share their content with a limited subset
of their entire friend network [4]. REACT leverages this
intuition by maintaining a “blacklist” of friends for each
user. The access control decision corresponding to these
friends would be a default “deny”. Note that the specific
number of blacklisted friends depends on various factors
for individual users such as their access control behavior
and their network size. For example, some users may want
to connect to and share with as many people as possible. For
these users, the number of friends in the blacklist would be
minimal. Alternatively, users may choose to interact with
only a small subset of their friends and the blacklist for
these users may contain a majority of their friends. Thus,
the blacklist construction in REACT is a personalized and
dynamic process in which a blacklist is learned based on
previous access controls decisions.
3. Evaluation
In order to evaluate the performance of REACT, we
conducted a user study in order to obtain ground truth access
control decisions to use for learning which is the standard
way of evaluating automated access control mechanisms in
the literature.
3.1. User Study
We created an application using Facebook Query Lan-
guage (FQL) and the Facebook Graph API for participants
to make access control decisions while disclosing 10 photos.
Five of these photos were randomly downloaded from their
Facebook profiles, and the participants were asked to select
and bring 5 other photos which they had not yet uploaded
on Facebook in order to avoid a scenario where a user
makes access control decisions for all photos during the
study for which they had already received comments and
likes before, as that may have influenced their decisions.
The participants were advised to bring photos which they
considered to be personal (either included them or a family
member) or considered sensitive so that they had a privacy
implication. The participants logged into the application
using their Facebook credentials and were then alerted about
the data that would be accessed and asked for explicit
permissions before moving on. Each participant was shown
10 photos sequentially on the screen, each on an individual
page. They were asked to select categories for the photos
from a predefined list of 15 popular Flickr categories, tag
any friends in the photo, and make access control decisions
for each photo. They were explicitly informed that any
friend who was not selected would be denied access to
the photo. Once the participants made the access control
decisions and selected the categories for all 10 photos, their
selections, friend lists and Total Friends and Mutual Friends
profile attributes of all their friends were stored.
3.2. Participants
This research experiment was conducted at Lancaster
University and participants were recruited primarily from
among the staff and students. Additionally, we invited some
participants who were external to the university through
personal communication channels. All participants were
compensated with £10 for their involvement.
We applied the typical pre- and post-experiment checks
to maximize data quality. In particular, before the exper-
iment, we screened participants and everyone who had a
Facebook account and had uploaded at least 10 photos
before the study was eligible to participate. After an initial
registration phase, 31 participants were selected who took
part. After completion of the user study, we checked all
responses to make sure participants had correctly completed
the experiment, finding 5 participants who did not (4 had
randomly selected lists of alphabetically sorted friends, 1
had selected one single but different friend for each photo).
The remaining 26 participants were considered for the anal-
yses, including 15 males (57.7%) and 11 females (42.3%).
The average age of the participants was 29 years (s.d =
6) and the average size of network was 265 friends (s.d =
121). In total, the ground truth dataset obtained during the
experiment consisted of 68,840 access control decisions.
3.3. Implementing REACT
We used Weka to implement REACT for the evaluation.
We used 10 fold cross validation on the manually labeled
dataset obtained from the user study. In our evaluations,
Naive Bayes classification algorithm, Support Vector Ma-
chines (SVM) and Random Forest were tried and we found
that Random Forest produced the best results. Thus, we do
not report results corresponding to Naive Bayes and SVM
in this paper due to lack of space.
We used CPM membership to represent Relationship
Type, implemented using the SNAP library, to create com-
munities for each user from their friend network (which
was downloaded during the user study as a list of “nodes”
representing each friend and “edges” representing links be-
tween them). The CPM algorithm can produce overlapping
communities depending on the value of “k” in the imple-
mentation [19], i.e., if the value of “k” is kept at 2, it
produces non-overlapping communities, but a value greater
than 2 produces increasing number of potential overlapping
communities. Given that we use community detection to
represent relationship type, it is essential to consider over-
lapping communities as individuals on social media may
share more than one relationship type (for e.g: a user’s “co-
worker” may also be a “family member”), so we changed
the value of “k” to check whether creating overlapping
communities has any effect on the performance of REACT.
The CPM membership is represented as a binary vector of
dimension n (where n is the number of communities CPM
creates for a user given her social network), in which each
element in the vector denotes whether a particular friend
belongs to (“1”) a particular community or not (“0”). For
the example shown in Figure 1, the particular friend shown
belongs to community “C1”, so it would have a 1 for this
community and a 0 for the rest of the communities CPM
created from the friend network of the user.
The Relationship Strength was represented by Total
Friends, Mutual Friends, which were both fetched directly
from the users’ and their friends’ profiles, and Friend Dif-
ference which was calculated as a difference between the
Total Friends attribute of the friend and the network size of
the user. The friend in Figure 1 has has 417 total friends,
24 mutual friends with the user and a friend difference of
112.
For Content, we used the tags, provided by the users
during the study, about photo categories and friends ap-
pearing in the photos. The photo categories selected by
the users were coded as a binary vector which denotes
whether the particular category was selected (“1”) or not
(“0”) by the user. In Figure 1, the user has selected 3 photo
categories, namely, “Cat3”, “Cat8” and “Cat13”. In addition
to the mandatory selection of photo categories, users were
also given the option of “tagging” their friends in photos.
This “tag” was also a binary variable for each of the user’s
friends where “1” represents the case where a particular
friend was tagged in a particular photo and a “0” represented
case where the particular friend was not tagged by the user.
For the photo in Figure 1, the user has tagged two friends:
“Friend121” and “Friend17”.
TABLE 1: Confusion matrix for evaluating performance
Recommendation
Allow Deny
Access Control Allow TP FN
Decisions Deny FP TN
REACT also benefits from isolating the Blacklisted
Friends and assigning a default “deny” decision to them.
For our evaluation, blacklisted friends were identified by
looking at the ground truth access control decisions made
by users during the user study and all friends who were
never granted access by the user in any of the 10 photos
were added to the blacklist. In reality, it may require even
less disclosure decisions to identify blacklisted friends for
each user. Our data shows that the median percentage of
blacklisted friends for a user identified after the first photo
is 76.8% and reaches 93.1% after only the fourth photo. This
suggests that the blacklist can be learned by REACT very
quickly for all users with very few previous access control
decisions made by the user.
3.4. Metrics
We evaluate the performance of REACT using the
ground truth access control decisions made by users during
the user study. In order to compare the actual access control
behavior with the recommendations made by REACT, we
use several established evaluation metrics for machine learn-
ing classifiers [20] to give a broad picture of the performance
of REACT. We measure Specificity (i.e., true negative rate)
as a proportion of “deny” instances (from ground truth) that
are correctly recommended as such. Sensitivity (i.e., true
positive rate or recall) is the proportion of “allow” instances
that are correctly recommended as “allow” by the REACT.
Precision is the proportion of “allow” recommendations
which were actually “allow” in the ground truth access
control decisions. Finally, Accuracy measures the proportion
of correct, both “allow” and “deny”, recommendations [20].
Table 1 shows the confusion matrix for evaluating the
performance of REACT. The described metrics are calcu-















TP + TN + FP + FN
(4)
where, TP = True Positives, FP = False Positives, TN =
True Negatives, FN = False Negatives
4. Results
4.1. Overall Results
Table 2 shows there is a rather important difference be-
tween specificity, sensitivity, and precision; with specificity
being much higher than the other two for the mode without
any balancing. One of the reasons for this may be that,
TABLE 2: Overall results produced by REACT for all met-
rics, for all k-values of CPM, and for all learning methods
Metric k-value Specificity Sensitivity Precision Accuracy
No k=2 97.8% 64.4% 74.5% 94.7%k=3 97.8% 65.6% 75.3% 94.9%
Balancing k=4 97.8% 64.6% 74.6% 94.8%k=5 97.8% 64.7% 74.4% 94.7%
Class k=2 97.1% 70.1% 84.8% 92.1%k=3 97.2% 72.7% 85.7% 92.6%
Balancer k=4 97.2% 70.7% 85.2% 92.3%k=5 97.2% 70.9% 85.2% 92.3%
Spread k=2 97.8% 64.5% 74.7% 94.8%k=3 97.8% 64.8% 74.3% 94.8%
Subsample k=4 97.7% 65.2% 74.2% 94.8%k=5 97.8% 64.5% 74.4% 94.7%
Cost k=2 95.0% 75.9% 60.2% 93.2%k=3 95.1% 76.6% 61.0% 93.4%
Sensitive k=4 95.0% 76.6% 60.6% 93.3%k=5 94.7% 77.5% 59.7% 93.2%
TABLE 3: Number of users for whom each attribute subset
provided best results




despite the use of a blacklisting approach by REACT, there
is still a difference between the number of friends being
recommended allow and deny, which is perfectly consistent
with the expected access behavior exhibited by users when
confronted with individual access control decisions [4]. In
cases like this, the machine learning literature recommends
the use of class balancing techniques [21] to produce more
balanced results across the three metrics. In particular, and
as shown in Table 2, in addition to the normal way of
training a classifier (first 4 rows), we considered the three
most used and well-known class-balancing techniques that
are implemented in Weka: 1) Class Balancer, in which
synthetic instances of the rarer class (“allow” in our case) are
introduced; 2) Spread Subsampling, in which the instances
from the most common class are randomly removed; and 3)
Cost Sensitive Learning, which penalizes misclassifications
of the rare class over the other.
Overall, we found that CPM with “k” value of 3 is the
most suitable as it provides the best results for all cases
and hence it can be said that considering overlapping CPM
communities benefits REACT. Looking at all the 4 metrics,
it is clear that Class Balancer provides the best overall trade-
off among the class balancing techniques. In the remain-
der of the paper, we only report results corresponding to
Class Balancer and using k = 3 for CPM unless specified
otherwise. For this configuration of REACT, the metrics
calculated using the entire dataset of 68840 access control
decision are: Specificity = 97.2%, Sensitivity = 72.7%,
Precision = 85.7% and Accuracy = 92.6%.
4.2. Personalizing REACT
So far in this paper, we have seen that REACT produces
highly accurate access control recommendations according
to our evaluations. It uses the attributes discussed earlier in
this paper to provide a holistic representation of the social
context and content of a disclosure. However, privacy and
TABLE 4: All metrics, calculated over entire dataset, when
using best attributes for each user compared to all attributes
Specificity Sensitivity Precision Accuracy
All Attributes 97.2% 72.7% 85.7% 92.6%
Best Attributes 96.8% 77.4% 84.5% 93.2%
TABLE 5: User characteristics to identify suitable subset of
attributes to configure REACT
Attribute T.F B.R Audience Communities AllowSubset Avg* SD* Total Used Ratio
PCA Avg 214.8 72.1% 13.5 15.2 6.1 5.2 6.1%
(8) SD 115.2 29% 18.3 19.4 4.3 4.5 6.3%
I. Gain Avg 322.4 61.1% 33.4 38.1 9.8 8.7 14%
(9) SD 150.8 26.8% 22.7 27.9 6.6 6 15.1%
All Avg 251.6 51.1% 42.9 43.1 9.6 8.9 17.6%
(9) SD 69.1 27% 32.1 28.3 6.1 6.6 15.4%
T.F - Total Friends
B.R - Blacklist Rate (ratio of friends who are blacklisted)
*Average and Std. deviation calculated across 10 photos for an average
user. Significant difference with Kruskal-Wallis Test (p <0.05)
access control behavior is very personal to individual users
[13], so there is the potential that a personalized approach
would render even better performance than a“one-size-fits-
all” solution. In order to personalize REACT, we tried two
established attribute selection techniques to identify subsets
of attributes that could be used to configure REACT for
individual users:
• Principal Components: Principal Components Anal-
ysis (PCA) is an established method of attribute
selection which was used to identify the appropriate
attributes for each individual user.
• Information Gain: In this approach, we only in-
cluded those attributes in the classifier which were
contributing in terms of information gain.
We tried these attribute selection techniques for each in-
dividual user and compared the results with those produced
by including all available attributes. We did not focus on
accuracy alone and wanted to find the best trade-off between
all metrics described earlier for each individual user when
selecting the best mechanism to select a subset of attributes.
Table 3 shows that using PCA to select optimal set
of attributes produces best results for 8 users while using
information gain is best for 9 users and 9 users for whom
using the entire set of attributes produces the best trade-
off. It is worth noting, however, that there were 17 users
for whom all three types of attributes (type and strength
of relationship as well as content) were represented in the
particular attributes that contributed to the classifier (either
PCA or Information Gain) and 9 other users for whom
at least two types of attributes were represented which
highlights the importance of considering all three types of
attributes while designing REACT.
Table 4 shows the results of REACT calculated over the
entire dataset of 68840 access control decisions made by all
users when: 1) All attributes were used for each of the 26
users, and 2) Only the best subset of attributes was used for
each individual user. It is evident from the table that using
the best attribute subset provides a better overall trade-off as
compared to using all attributes for all users as it provides
a big improvement in terms of sensitivity at the expense of
very little change for the other metrics.
We also looked at the individual user characteristics in
order to try and recommend a particular attribute subset
(PCA, Information Gain or All Attributes) for an individual
user by looking at their characteristics. Looking at Table 5,
we find that PCA can be used to select attributes for users
who have smaller friend networks and who select from a
smaller section of their network as shown by their higher
blacklist rate (ratio of total friends who were blacklisted),
lower allow ratio (percentage of total access control deci-
sions which were “allow”) and smaller number of commu-
nities used.
5. Related Work
REACT uses a conjunction of relationship type, relation-
ship strength and information about the content to provide
users with access control recommendations. As we list in
Table 6, none of the previous works, to the best of our
knowledge, have used a conjunction of all these three types
of information to create a holistic solution.
There have been a number of works that proposed using
community detection algorithms to facilitate the definition
of access control policies [8], [9], [22], [23]. Although com-
munity detection could indeed help in learning the access
control policies of individual users [23], it does not provide
enough goodness of fit with actual access control decisions
by users to be used as a single source of information [14].
Another method for access control recommendation has
been to use profile attributes [10], [11], [16], [17], [24]. In
particular, recommendations in this line of work are based
on measures of similarity or closeness between users. Al-
though the closeness and strength of relationships is known
to influence access control decisions, it is not the only aspect
considered by users when making access control decisions
[4], [25].
Finally, previous research showed that tags can be used
to create access control policies [18], some methods have
been proposed to classify or categorize the nature of the
content and leverage this classification to inform access
control decisions [12], and the nature of the content was
also used to detect cliques in a user’s network which can
then be used to enhance access control mechanisms [26].
However, the context of a disclosure cannot be completely
defined only with the content, and most privacy theories
like contextual integrity also recognize the crucial role of
the individuals involved and their social relationships [1].
6. Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we presented REACT, an access control
recommendation mechanism which leverages information
representing interpersonal relationships between social me-
dia users in conjunction with information about the content.
Considering these types of information together enables
REACT to represent the overall social context of the infor-
mation disclosure and make relevant access control recom-
mendations to the users. Our empirical evaluation of REACT
shows that it performs very well with respect to all the




Amershi et al. [10] 6 4 6
Cheek et al. [9] 4 6 6
Danezis [23] 4 6 6
Fang et al. [8] 4 4 6
Jones et al. [22] 4 6 6
McAuley et al. [11] 6 4 6
Misra et al. [17] 6 4 6
Squicciarini et al. [24] 6 4 4
Squicciarini et al. [12] 6 6 4
Yildiz et al. [26] 6 6 4
metrics including accuracy. We further explore the potential
of personalizing REACT by observing that using Principal
Component Analysis (PCA) to select the most appropriate
attribute set for users who grant access to a smaller section
of their friend network may improve results even more. The
design of REACT is agnostic to the type of information
being shared and can be easily adapted to other types such
as text.
An interesting future work may be to investigate the best
method of obtaining information about the content. In our
evaluation, we used the annotations provided by the users as
these are usually considered minimally intrusive [18]. While
this is shown to produce good results and the mechanism
does not need to know the content itself (which could
bear privacy implications) but just metadata about it, other
options such as automatic analysis of the content [12] may
be more beneficial if the users’ effort in annotating content is
deemed to be prohibitively large. As REACT is agnostic to
the type of information being shared, any such mechanism
can be easily adapted to the particular type of content (such
as natural language processing for text). Another future work
could be extending REACT to consider the cases where one
user is not the only one potentially affected by the content to
be shared. This could be achieved by implementing conflict
detection and resolution mechanisms for when the access
control decisions of the users involved differ [27].
References
[1] H. Nissenbaum, “Privacy as contextual integrity,” Washington Law
Review, vol. 79, p. 119, 2004.
[2] G. Hull, H. R. Lipford, and C. Latulipe, “Contextual gaps: Privacy
issues on facebook,” Ethics and information technology, 2011.
[3] M. Johnson, S. Egelman, and S. M. Bellovin, “Facebook and privacy:
it’s complicated,” in Proc. of SOUPS. ACM, 2012, p. 9.
[4] S. Kairam, M. Brzozowski, D. Huffaker, and E. Chi, “Talking in
circles: selective sharing in google+,” in Proc. of the SIGCHI. ACM,
2012, pp. 1065–1074.
[5] P. Wisniewski, B. P. Knijnenburg, and H. Richter Lipford, “Profiling
facebook users privacy behaviors,” in SOUPS2014 Workshop on
Privacy Personas and Segmentation, 2014.
[6] A. Mazzia, K. LeFevre, and E. Adar, “The pviz comprehension tool
for social network privacy settings,” in Proceedings of the Eighth
Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security. ACM, 2012, p. 13.
[7] G. Misra and J. M. Such, “How socially aware are social media
privacy controls?” IEEE Computer, vol. 49, no. 3, pp. 96–99, 2016.
[8] L. Fang and K. LeFevre, “Privacy wizards for social networking
sites,” in Proc. of the 19th international conference on World wide
web. ACM, 2010, pp. 351–360.
[9] G. P. Cheek and M. Shehab, “Human effects of enhanced privacy
management models,” Dependable and Secure Computing, IEEE
Transactions on, vol. 11, no. 2, pp. 142–154, 2014.
[10] S. Amershi, J. Fogarty, and D. Weld, “Regroup: Interactive machine
learning for on-demand group creation in social networks,” in Proc.
of the SIGCHI. ACM, 2012, pp. 21–30.
[11] J. J. McAuley and J. Leskovec, “Learning to discover social circles
in ego networks.” in NIPS, vol. 272, 2012, pp. 548–556.
[12] A. C. Squicciarini, S. Sundareswaran, D. Lin, and J. Wede, “A3p:
adaptive policy prediction for shared images over popular content
sharing sites,” in Proceedings of the 22nd ACM conference on Hy-
pertext and hypermedia. ACM, 2011, pp. 261–270.
[13] A. Acquisti, L. Brandimarte, and G. Loewenstein, “Privacy and
human behavior in the age of information,” Science, vol. 347, no.
6221, pp. 509–514, 2015.
[14] G. Misra, J. M. Such, and H. Balogun, “Non-sharing communities? an
empirical study of community detection for access control decisions,”
in IEEE/ACM ASONAM, 2016. IEEE, 2016, pp. 49–56.
[15] E. Gilbert and K. Karahalios, “Predicting tie strength with social
media,” in Proceedings of the SIGCHI conference on human factors
in computing systems. ACM, 2009, pp. 211–220.
[16] R. L. Fogue´s, J. M. Such, A. Espinosa, and A. Garcia-Fornes, “Bff:
A tool for eliciting tie strength and user communities in social
networking services,” Information Systems Frontiers, pp. 1–13, 2013.
[17] G. Misra, J. M. Such, and H. Balogun, “Improve: Identifying minimal
profile vectors for similarity based access control,” in IEEE TrustCom.
IEEE, 2016, pp. 868–875.
[18] C.-m. A. Yeung, L. Kagal, N. Gibbins, and N. Shadbolt, “Providing
access control to online photo albums based on tags and linked data.”
in AAAI Spring Symposium: Social Semantic Web: Where Web 2.0
Meets Web 3.0, 2009, pp. 9–14.
[19] I. Dere´nyi, G. Palla, and T. Vicsek, “Clique percolation in random
networks,” Physical review letters, vol. 94, no. 16, p. 160202, 2005.
[20] G. Calikli, M. Law, A. K. Bandara, A. Russo, L. Dickens, B. A.
Price, A. Stuart, M. Levine, and B. Nuseibeh, “Privacy dynamics:
Learning privacy norms for social software,” in Proceedings of the
11th International Symposium on Software Engineering for Adaptive
and Self-Managing Systems. ACM, 2016, pp. 47–56.
[21] N. Japkowicz and S. Stephen, “The class imbalance problem: A
systematic study,” Intelligent data analysis, 2002.
[22] S. Jones and E. O’Neill, “Feasibility of structural network clustering
for group-based privacy control in social networks,” in Proceedings
of the SOUPS. ACM, 2010, p. 9.
[23] G. Danezis, “Inferring privacy policies for social networking ser-
vices,” in Proc of the 2nd ACM workshop on Security and artificial
intelligence, 2009.
[24] A. Squicciarini, S. Karumanchi, D. Lin, and N. DeSisto, “Identifying
hidden social circles for advanced privacy configuration,” Computers
& Security, vol. 41, pp. 40–51, 2014.
[25] A. E. Marwick et al., “I tweet honestly, i tweet passionately: Twitter
users, context collapse, and the imagined audience,” New Media &
Society, vol. 13, no. 1, pp. 114–133, 2011.
[26] H. Yildiz and C. Kruegel, “Detecting social cliques for automated
privacy control in online social networks,” in Pervasive Computing
and Communications Workshops (PERCOM Workshops), 2012 IEEE
International Conference on. IEEE, 2012, pp. 353–359.
[27] J. M. Such and N. Criado, “Resolving multi-party privacy conflicts
in social media,” IEEE Transactions on Knowledge and Data Engi-
neering, vol. 28, no. 7, pp. 1851–1863, 2016.
